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COMMENTS
A PROBLEM LURKING JUST BELOW THE
SURFACE: THE NEED IN TEXAS FOR
DORMANT MINERAL LEGISLATION
By Terrell Fenner
ABSTRACT
A long history of oil and gas development in Texas has made the state the
number one energy producer in the United States, and the bulk of that energy
is produced from fuels acquired by drilling into the vast natural resources that
sit below the state. As a side effect of this long history, it is common for the
surface and mineral estates in Texas to be severed, and many severances happened several generations ago. This history has spread mineral interests between dozens of owners in some cases, many who are unknown and cannot be
found. Absentee ownership has diluted the value of these fractionalized interests and has made use by their non-absentee counterparts more difficult.
Existing laws that have been used in the past to clear absentee owners from
title have not been effective in the context of a severed mineral estate, as those
laws evolved primarily to address surface interests, or to accomplish other
purposes with only incidental effect on land titles.
This Comment discusses the inadequacy of the current methods used in
Texas to remove absentee owners from mineral titles and illustrates the need
for a more effective remedy. It then offers a dormant mineral act that suits the
unique cultural and economic needs of Texas and addresses the growing fractionalization of Texas’s mineral estates.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For about the last hundred years, a problem has been festering in
Texas, just below the feet of its citizens. Growing exponentially each
generation, it waits to reveal itself until the last possible moment, and
when it is finally discovered, there is often little that can be done
about it. This Comment discusses the sad state of the current remedies for—and one potential solution to—the problem known as fractionalization of mineral estates.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/LR.V2.I3.5
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Dormant mineral acts, sometimes called mineral lapse acts, serve to
clear title and remedy fractionalization of mineral interests. Despite
areas that display severe fractionalization of mineral estates,1 Texas
does not have a dormant mineral act, or any other method to effectively handle the issue. This omission has resulted in diluted mineral
titles and in some cases has hindered cotenants ability to market and
develop their own interests.2 As the number-one-producing state of
crude oil and natural gas,3 it is surprising that Texas relies on inefficient and ineffective methods of dealing with the uncertainties caused
by landowners who cannot be located and who have not put their mineral interests to productive use. In light of the current issues, Texas
should consider adopting a dormant mineral act to ameliorate the
problem.
From the outset, it should be clear that this Comment is not proposing a method of attack on owners who choose not to develop their
mineral interests. Instead, it proposes a solution to the absentee owners problem—those owners who cannot be identified and have let
their mineral estate go unused because they are not aware that they
own mineral interests and cannot be found.
After the discovery of oil in Texas, speculators purchased, severed,
and divided mineral interests in the name of profit.4 The boom, precipitated by the Spindletop Field around 1902, which produced 17.5
million barrels of oil annually, resulted in speculators pooling money
to buy as many mineral acres as they could.5 Many of these investments did not pay off, so the investors just moved on to the next

1. Telephone Interview with Jason Hughes, President, Polomsky Hughes & Assoc., L.L.C. (Jan. 15, 2014). Mr. Hughes, a Landman, recounted his experience with a
particular twelve-acre tract of land in an east Texas county that was owned by a husband and wife in the mid-twenties. Both died intestate without children. They were
the first of many of the interest owners who died intestate, and his title examination
revealed that, currently, over 150 people have an interest in the minerals, and the
majority of them could not be located. Leasing efforts were abandoned. He also
stated that in certain Texas counties it was not uncommon for tracts to have over ten
mineral interest owners, and many owners cannot be located, even after a diligent
search. Id.
2. Hughes, supra note 1. Mr. Hughes stated that it is not uncommon for tracts
with a high concentration of owners who cannot be found to be excluded from development. Id.
3. Crude Oil Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (2014), http://www.eia.gov/
dnav/pet/pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbbl_a.htm; Monthly Natural Gas Gross Production
Report, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/oil_gas/natural_gas/data_publications/eia914/eia914.html.
4. Mary G. Ramos, Oil and Texas: A Cultural History, TEX. ALMANAC, http://
www.texasalmanac.com/topics/business/oil-and-texas-cultural-history (last visited Feb.
27, 2014).
5. Robert Wooster & Christine Moor Sanders, Spindletop Oilfield, HANDBOOK
OF TEX. ONLINE (June 15, 2010), https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/arti
cles/dos03.
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boomtown and tried again.6 The unprofitable interests that the speculators bought were regularly forgotten, seldom sold, and often passed
through intestacy.7 The net result is that some areas display extreme
fractionalization of the mineral estates.8 Out of these divided interests, many owners do not even know that they hold title to valuable
mineral estates,9 as many of these interests were severed from the surface decades ago.10
This boom-and-bust pattern has occurred with some regularity in
Texas and will likely continue. New oil and gas plays are continually
being discovered, and existing basins are being revisited with the advent of new technology. In the last decade, the Barnett Shale, covering about fifteen counties,11 the Eagle Ford Shale, covering at least
twenty-six counties,12 and the Permian Basin area have all seen a
surge in drilling and development. These new booms have the potential to spread and exacerbate the already prevalent issues of mineral
fractionalization to new highs.
This excessive fractionalization can retard development efforts, as
business realities make developing without all mineral owners’ participation especially unappealing. The Texas rule is that when a mineral
owner produces minerals from common property without having secured the consent of his cotenants, that developing cotenant is accountable to the other cotenants for the value of the minerals taken
less the necessary and reasonable cost of producing and marketing the
minerals.13 This means that the cotenant who does not participate in
the development is entitled to his proportionate share of profits, after
deducting development costs, of a producing well. However, the nonparticipating cotenant is not liable for his share of the costs of a dry
hole.14 These two rules, when taken together, result in a regime
where a willing cotenant must bear the whole potential loss of failure,
and this potential loss is only offset by his share of the gains of a profitable well. This presents a substantial obstacle to developing tracts of
6. Ronald W. Polston, Legislation, Existing and Proposed, Concerning Marketability of Mineral Titles, 7 LAND & WATER L. REV. 73, 75 (1972).
7. Id.
8. Joshua Elias Teichman, Comment, Dormant Mineral Acts and Texaco, Inc. v.
Short: Undermining the Taking Clause, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 157, 159 (1982).
9. Hughes, supra note 1.
10. Id. Mr. Hughes noted that, depending on the county, the initial severance
usually occurred between the 1910s and 1930s. Within a county, he said the dates
were fairly consistent, and a function of when an oil boom happened in the vicinity.
Id.
11. Marc Airhart, The Barnett Shale Gas Boom, GEOLOGY.COM, http://geology
.com/research/barnett-shale-gas.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
12. Dan Vergano et al., Texas Oil Still Booming, Web illus. to Oil! New Texas
Boom Spawns Riches, Headache, USA TODAY (Jan. 15, 2014, 9:37 P.M.), http://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/01/15/texas-oil-boom-fracking/4481977/.
13. Cox v. Davison, 397 S.W.2d 200, 201 (Tex. 1965).
14. Neeley v. Intercity Mgmt. Corp., 732 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi 1987, no writ).
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land where there is a mineral owner who cannot be located and other
owners are interested in developing the property.
Given the availability of a legal mechanism designed explicitly to
handle mineral fractionalization, coupled with Texas’s vast economic
interest in developing oil and gas reserves, it seems counterintuitive
that Texas has not enacted a dormant mineral act.
In this Comment, first the Author will give a summary of dormant
mineral statutes generally. Then the Author will examine the shortcomings of the commonly available mechanisms in Texas of transferring mineral title from an unproductive owner to a productive one.
These mechanisms were largely developed to address unproductive
surface owners, and are inappropriate methods for disposing of unproductive mineral owners. Finally, the Author will propose a dormant mineral statute for Texas that allows productive owners to retain
their mineral estates, identifies owners to facilitate transparency in title, and consolidates unproductive owners’ interests in productive
owners.
II. DORMANT MINERAL ACTS GENERALLY
Dormant mineral statutes are designed to ensure mineral estates
are in the hands of owners who have an interest in them—interest in
the colloquial, not the legal sense. That person might be an estate
owner who has demonstrated that interest in some way, or the surface
owner, who is interested by virtue of being servient to the mineral
estate. A general formulation of a dormant mineral act may be, “A
mineral interest that has not been ‘used’ in the last 20 years will revert
to the owner of the surface tract that the minerals sit below.”15 These
statutes condition retention of interest in a mineral estate on compliance with use requirements set out in the statute.16 The uses that will
preserve an interest in a mineral estate are predictable and generally
include exploration, production, and paper transactions.17
States began experimenting with dormant mineral statutes in the
1970s, and the statutes were regularly challenged and struck down.18
The climate changed, however, after the United States Supreme Court
decided the seminal case of Texaco, Inc. v. Short.19
15. As a general example of a dormant mineral act, this example is not as nuanced
as actual enacted dormant mineral acts, but serves as a useful illustration of the broad
workings of these acts.
16. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-03(1)(b) (West 2014); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 5301.56(B)(3)(c) (LexisNexis 2004).
17. See, e.g., NEB. REV. ST. § 57-229 (2014).
18. Dormant Minerals Acts and the Marcellus and Utica Shale Plays, JONES DAY 2
(Apr. 2013), http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/1b6be8ca-ea24-4af6-a9b9da6385cf6f92/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/59cd6b32-2616-4e71-85eae44aa5ab354a/Dormant%20Minerals%20Acts.pdf.
19. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
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In 1982, the United States Supreme Court handed down its ruling
on an Indiana dormant mineral act.20 The Indiana statute provided
that severed mineral estates would revert to the surface owner if unused for a period of twenty years.21 Mineral owners who had not used
their interests in the period provided could save their interests by filing a statement of claim in the recorder’s office.22 From the date of
enactment, the statute also provided for a two-year grace period for
owners of unused mineral interests to file the appropriate statement
of claim to preserve their interests.23 This statute was self-executing
and, by its language, did not require any notice to a mineral owner
when a lapse occurred.24
Texaco was a lessee of eleven lessors who had not used their mineral interests for twenty years or filed a statement of claim within the
two-year grace period from the date of the enactment of the statute.25
The Indiana trial court found that the statute “deprived appellants
of property without due process of law, and effected a taking of property without just compensation.”26 The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision.27
Texaco challenged the statute at the Supreme Court, primarily on
takings and due process grounds.28 After an initial, lengthy discussion
on whether Indiana could enact the law, the Court rejected Texaco’s
challenges and upheld the act.29
The Court laid the framework used to pass takings muster in the
discussion about Indiana’s power to enact the statute. In that discussion, the Court asked, and answered in the affirmative, if a state could
establish a statutory abandonment of a severed mineral estate.30 The
Court was not troubled that Indiana considered severed mineral estates equal to and entitled to the same protections as a fee simple
estate in the surface.31 “[T]he State has the power to condition permanent retention of that property right on the performance of reasonable conditions that indicate a present intention to retain the
interest.”32
After concluding that the severed mineral estates were statutorily
abandoned because of nonuse, the Court concluded that the state had
20. Id. at 540 (upholding the constitutionality of IND. CODE §§ 32-5-11-1 to 32-511-8 (1976)).
21. Id. at 518.
22. Id. at 518–19.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 521.
26. Id. at 523.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 523.
29. Id. at 540.
30. Id. at 525–30.
31. Id. at 525–26.
32. Id. at 526.
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not taken anything, and because of this, owed no compensation.33
The owner’s own action—or in this case, inaction—of failing to make
use of the property or to file a savings claim in compliance with the
statute, caused the loss of the property, not the action of the state.34
At the end of the analysis, the Court also declared that the “requirement that an owner of a property interest that has not been used for
[twenty] years must come forward and file a current statement of
claim is not itself a ‘taking.’ ”35
The due process challenge warranted a bit lengthier discussion.
Texaco challenged the adequacy of the notice of the act given by the
state, and the idea that its property interest could be extinguished
without notice from the surface owner.36
In answering the question of how much notice the state was required to give its citizenry of the existence and requirements of the
act, the Court took a stance deferential to the Indiana legislature.37
The notice, the Court stated, had to “afford the citizenry a reasonable
opportunity to familiarize itself with its terms and comply,”38 but
when the legislature establishes a grace period, a period after enactment but before the law becomes effective, the Court holds the period
determined sufficient by them in high regard.39 Based on this deference, and in accord with the Indiana Supreme Court, the Court held
that the two-year grace period was constitutionally sufficient.40
The Court then dismissed the contention that the surface owners
need to provide the mineral owners with notice of the lapse of the
mineral estate.41 The Court differentiated between the notice required for the self-executing feature of the statute, which was the subject of the grace period discussion, and the notice required to
judicially determine if a lapse did occur.42 While the Court acknowledged that the judicial determination of a lapse would require notice
consistent with due process requirements,43 requiring notice of the
self-executing feature of the statute would be equivalent to stating
that a self-executing statute without notice is unconstitutional.44
Finally, the Court disposed of an equal protection challenge relating
to mineral owners with over ten interests in the county.45 After re33. Id. at 530.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 531.
37. Id. at 532.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 532–33.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 533.
43. Id. at 534; Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
(1950).
44. Texaco, 454 U.S. at 534.
45. Id. at 538–40.
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jecting all of Texaco’s constitutional challenges, the Court allowed the
act to stand.46
Beyond simply vindicating the Indiana act, the Court’s various
holdings also provided future legislators and litigators a framework
for drafting, attacking, and defending future dormant mineral acts.
III. CURRENT “SOLUTIONS”

AND

THEIR INFIRMITIES

Standing alone, constitutionality is not a particularly compelling argument for adopting a dormant mineral act. If existing law sufficiently addresses an issue, additional laws muddy the waters. So then,
it is imperative to convince ourselves that existing law does not adequately remedy the issue of excessive mineral fractionalization at the
hands of unproductive owners.
The Texas Comptroller of Public Accountants reports that there is
currently almost half-a-billion dollars in unclaimed oil and gas royalties in the state account.47 This money represents a staggering number
of mineral owners who cannot be located and are still in the mineral
titles. Producing oil and gas wells without at least some owners that
cannot be found are the minority,48 and with development reaching
new parts of Texas without a historic oil and gas industry, the problem
is getting worse.49 The oil and gas industry has seen nearly a threefold increase in unclaimed royalties in the last decade, and generational division of previously worthless mineral interests is a primary
factor.50 When you further consider that these figures underreport
the true number of those owners, because it does not account for mineral estates that are not producing royalties, it becomes clear that absentee ownership of mineral interests is no small problem and every
passing generation exponentiates the problem.
The common and statutory law have developed methods and mechanisms for divesting an owner of surface property or personal property who has allowed the property to sit for a prolonged time in
disuse; however, these solutions have not proven to be of particular
value in dealing with the unproductive mineral owner. The most apparent of these solutions is adverse possession. Further, tax liens
serve to some effect of removing an unproductive surface owner from
title.51 Neither of these, however, is of much value for unproductive
mineral owners. Similarly, common law abandonment is of little use
in the real property context. Finally, statutory receiverships, designed
46. Id. at 540.
47. Jennifer Hiller, Unclaimed Mineral Royalties Increasing, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS–NEWS (Aug. 5, 2013, 1:15 P.M.), http://www.expressnews.com/news/energy/arti
cle/Unclaimed-mineral-royalties-increasing-4704339.php.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 34.01 (West 2013).
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to allow development of minerals when an owner cannot be located,
are a temporary solution for owners interested in developing but serve
no title-clearing functions.
A. Adverse Possession
First, let us examine adverse possession in Texas. Texas codified the
requirements for adverse possession and established twenty-five-, ten, five-, and three-year limitation periods, with increasingly stringent
requirements for the adverse possessor.52 The courts have interpreted
these sections to require the possession be “actual, . . . visible, continuous, notorious, distinct, hostile (i.e., adverse), and of such a character
as to indicate unmistakably an assertion of a claim of exclusive ownership in the occupant.”53 Although the statutes do not explicitly apply
to severed mineral estates, courts have implicitly approved of its use
in this manner in numerous cases, conceptually, at least.54
Adverse possession of an unsevered mineral estate (one where the
minerals and the surface have not been separated) can be accomplished by adverse possession of the surface.55 The severed mineral
estate, while theoretically subject to the same rule of law, must satisfy
much more difficult—and more uncertain—evidentiary showings than
what must be shown to establish a claim of adverse possession of the
surface.56
Among the requirements that an adverse possessor must show to
perfect title, the most troublesome in a severed-mineral-estate case is
the element of actual possession. An adverse possessor of a surface
estate can show actual possession of the surface by a wide range of
means from fencing, to grazing cattle, to development.57 Thus, an adverse possessor of the surface has a range of options reasonably accessible to him to perfect his title in the surface estate.
In the context of mineral estates, however, an adverse possessor has
much more limited options to establish actual possession. “Something
more” is demanded of the adverse possessor of a mineral estate in
52. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.021 to .028 (West 2013).
53. Rhodes v. Cahill, 802 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Tex. 1990).
54. See, e.g., West v. Hapgood, 174 S.W.2d 963, 966 (Tex. 1943); Rio Bravo Oil Co.
v. Staley Oil Co., 158 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Tex. 1942); Dennis v. McCasland, 97 S.W.2d
684, 686 (Tex. 1936).
55. Watkins v. Certain-Teed Prods. Corp., 231 S.W.2d 981, 984 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Amarillo 1950, no writ) (“The rule is well established in Texas that an adverse entry
upon the surface of land extends downward and includes title to the underlying minerals where at the time of entry there had been no severance of the mineral estate.”).
56. Christopher M. Alspach, Adverse Possession of Severed Mineral Interests and
the Need for Statutory Guidance, 37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1073, 1087 (2005) (discussing
the many gaps and uncertainties in adverse possession law regarding mineral estates
in Texas).
57. See generally Kazmir v. Benavides, 288 S.W.3d 557, 563 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).

2015]

DORMANT MINERAL LEGISLATION

509

Texas.58 NGP v. Pool held that, to establish the “something more,” to
show actual possession of the severed mineral estate, drilling and production must occur.59
In Lyles v. Dodge, a party attempted to support an adverse possession claim against the record mineral owners of a tract of land.60 The
adverse possessors drilled a three-hundred-foot deep well in search of
oil or water.61 The adverse possessors did not find either substance.62
Because the adverse possessors did not find any oil, there was not an
actual possession to begin to run the limitation period for adverse
possession.63
Case law explicitly laying out what a court demands to satisfy the
requirements for a successful adverse possession of a mineral estate is
sparse, likely because of the economic risk involved in developing a
mineral estate without title. Kirkpatrick v. Gulf demonstrates just
how much courts need to establish adverse possession of the mineral
estate.64 Gulf Oil drilled eight wells on 320 acres between February
11, 1926 and April 15, 1930.65 In reviewing the facts, the court found
that Gulf completed a dry hole on March 8, 1926, then another dry
hole on April 13, 1927.66 Gulf then drilled the third, fourth, and fifth
wells, completed on August 26, 1927, March 25, 1928, and May 12,
1928, respectively.67 The court’s opinion does not make it clear
whether these three wells were dry holes or producers.68 Gulf’s sixth
well, completed September 7, 1928, and its seventh well, completed
June 17, 1929, were both producing wells.69 Gulf completed its eighth
well on April 15, 1930, but again, the court is unclear on if it was a
producing well.70
Based on Gulf’s extensive operations, the court held that Gulf had
obtained title to the minerals under the five-year adverse possession
statute.71 Although the court was not explicit in its reasoning in this
decision, it is fair to say that Gulf establishes that an adverse possessor
who engages in continuous drilling and production operations for the
58. Broughton v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 105 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Tex. Civ. App.—
El Paso 1937, writ ref’d).
59. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Pool, 124 S.W.3d 188, 193 (Tex. 2003).
60. Lyles v. Dodge, 228 S.W. 316, 316 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1921, no writ).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 317.
64. Kilpatrick v. Gulf Prod. Co., 139 S.W.2d 653, 657 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont,
1940, writ denied).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 657–58.
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length of time required by statute can sustain an adverse possession
claim in a mineral estate.72
Texas cases where less than continuous production established adverse possession of a severed mineral estate are sparse and lack clarity. Christopher Alspach, in his article Adverse Possession of Severed
Mineral Interests and the Need for Statutory Guidance, has identified
several cases that thoroughly illustrate the uncertainty of this middle
ground of adverse possession of a severed mineral estate.73 Suffice to
say that Alspach spends around fifty pages discussing the various nuances of adverse possession of severed mineral estates before suggesting that the case law is so unclear that Texas needs statutory
reform to properly handle claims of this type.74
Given a well now costs between four and fifteen million dollars,75
coupled with uncertainty in the middle grounds of the case law, it is no
wonder that few people are capable or willing to engage in activities
that would result in adverse possession of mineral estates.
Making adverse possession even more difficult is the fact that the
potential “adverse possessor” could likely be a cotenant mineral
owner. In Texas, cotenants can enter the mineral estate by drilling for
and developing oil or gas without consent of other cotenants, and
even over other cotenants objections.76 Because each cotenant has
equal rights to develop the estate, the mere act of drilling and developing a well may not constitute notice of adverse possession by
ouster.77 Instead, to show ouster, a cotenant must act in an unmistakably hostile manner towards his cotenants.78 While the act of drilling
or developing may be sufficient to establish a claim of adverse possession by stranger to title, because cotenants have rights to property that
strangers do not, the courts require more definite acts of ouster.79
The final shortcoming of adverse possession is that, even when an
adverse possession of a mineral estate can be established, the context
that it is likely to occur can result in an adverse possession of a fee
simple determinable, more commonly known as a Texas oil and gas
lease.80 As discussed above, the cost of oil and gas development in
Texas is prohibitively expensive and mineral owners who do want to
72. See Alspach, supra note 56, at 1095.
73. See id. at 1087–19.
74. See id. at 1085–20.
75. See Jared Anderson, How Much Does a Shale Gas Well Cost? ‘It Depends,’
CNBC (Aug. 8, 2013, 8:08 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100946625; Drilling Operations, PETROSTRATEGIES, INC., http://www.petrostrategies.org/Learning_Center/drill
ing_operations.htm#Drilling Costs (last visited Feb. 27, 2014).
76. Willson v. Superior Oil Co., 274 S.W.2d 947, 950 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana
1954, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
77. BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Marshall, 342 S.W.3d 59, 70 (Tex. 2011).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Pool, 124 S.W.3d 188, 199 (Tex. 2003).
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develop almost universally lease81 their minerals to an oil company.82
In NGP v. Pool, the Texas Supreme Court held that an oil company
that held over after the termination of its lease for a period long
enough to satisfy the adverse possession requirements did not adversely possess a fee simple.83 Instead, the court reasoned that because the oil company was only peacefully possessing in a capacity
consistent with an oil and gas lessee, a fee simple determinable was all
that it was entitled to adversely possess.84 This means that when the
“lease” acquired by adverse possession expires, the mineral estate reverts fully to the owner, and the title has not been affected in any
permanent manner.85
Based on the reasons above, a strong case can be made against the
effectiveness of the mechanism of adverse possession as a method to
get absentee owners out of title. The difficulty of establishing an adverse possession, the limitations on likely cotenant adverse possessors,
and the potential outcome of an adverse possession accomplished by a
lessee all tend to show that a better solution needs to be found.
B. Other Methods
Adverse possession is not the only title-clearing mechanism that is
demonstrably less capable of handling mineral interests compared to
surface interests. Property taxes, although not intended to function as
title-clearing devices, ensure that if a surface owner vanishes, the neglected property will likely change hands. In time, the county will
likely force a tax sale on the estate because of delinquent property
taxes. Severed mineral interests, however, are seldom subject to this
fate.86
While Texas law explicitly declares that producing and non-producing87 minerals are taxable, the reality is that local governments seldom
appraise small and non-producing mineral interests.88 Small enough
interests—those interests having a value of less than $500.00—may
even be eligible for a tax exemption,89 further insulating them from
tax suits. Counties can choose not to assess taxes on small interests as
a matter of expense.90 The amount of labor that the county has to
81. Id. at 192.
82. Hughes, supra note 1. Mr. Hughes commented that in over a decade in the oil
and gas business he had never heard of a mineral owner who did not have strong
industry ties developing their own property.
83. Natural Gas Pipeline, 124 S.W.3d at 202.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Polston, supra note 6, at 76.
87. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 1.04(2)(D) (West 2013).
88. Polston, supra note 6, at 76; W. Everett DuPuy, Clouds on Title, 18 TEX. B.J.
275, 275 (1955).
89. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.146 (West 2013).
90. Shirley Norwood Jones, Constitutional and Practical Problems in Legislation to
Terminate Non-Productive Mineral Interests, 3 MISS. C. L. REV. 175, 181–82 (1983).
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expend to produce a thorough and accurate listing and appraisal of a
county worth of mineral estates may not be a good investment for it.91
Infrequent assessments and exemptions for the very interests at issue
result in fewer sales of these interests.92
Yet another argument against the tax sale is that even if a mineral
interest does make it to the auction block, anyone may purchase the
interest.93 While purchase by a stranger may alleviate the issue of the
unknown owner, it does nothing to lessen the fractionalization but
merely substitutes an unknown owner for a new, known one.94
Tax sales are not designed to be a title clearing mechanism and, not
surprisingly, are not very effective.95 Severely limited application and
the primary goal of revenue collection, not tidy mineral titles, render
these sales essentially useless in remedying the issue of excessive fractionalization of mineral estates.
Finally—if only because of the grounds that dormant mineral acts
are sustained constitutionally—it should be noted that Texas mineral
estates are not subject to common-law abandonment.96 While personal property may be abandoned by an act of abandonment coupled
with an intent to forsake,97 the same act directed at a piece of real
property, like a mineral estate,98 will not cause the loss of title. Only a
deed, judgment, or other means recognized by law will act to pass title
in Texas.99 Non-use of a freehold estate will not extinguish the
estate.100
The only practical measure to circumvent an absentee owner’s title
and develop without his or her consent in Texas is a receivership
lease.101 This is a lease granted by a court-appointed receiver and entered into on behalf of the unknown owner or owners.102 These receivership leases allow cotenants (or owners of neighboring tracts that
must be pooled with a tract with an absentee owner) to develop in the
91. Id. at 181.
92. Id.
93. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 34.01(m) (West 2013).
94. Polston, supra note 6, at 76.
95. Id.
96. Rogers v. Ricane Enters, Inc., 772 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Tex. 1989); Ingram v. State,
261 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2008, no pet.).
97. Ingram, 261 S.W.3d at 753.
98. Pounds v. Jurgens, 296 S.W.3d 100, 107 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2009, pet. denied) (“In Texas, minerals in place are realty and, as such, are subject to
ownership, severance, and sale.”).
99. City of Corpus Christi v. McCarver, 275 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex. Civ. App.—San
Antonio 1955) rev’d on other grounds, 284 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. 1955).
100. Hanks v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 14 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1928) aff’d, 24 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1930).
101. Ernest E. Smith, Methods for Facilitating the Development of Oil and Gas
Lands Burdened with Outstanding Mineral Interests, 43 TEX. L. REV. 129, 145 (1964).
102. Id.
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short term, but do nothing to clear the title of the mineral estate long
term.103
A receivership lease is acquired through a receivership proceeding
as authorized by Texas Civil Practice and Remedy Code section
64.091.104 The party seeking the receivership must allege that the unknown owner has not been located after a diligent search and the
party seeking the receivership will suffer substantial damage or injury
unless the receiver is appointed.105 Upon appointment, a receiver
must immediately execute an oil and gas lease for the property106 on
the same terms as an “ordinarily prudent man of business would exercise in the management of his own affairs.”107
While receivership leases do allow development in spite of a missing
owner, they are cumbersome, requiring litigation every time a lease is
desired.108 More importantly, receiverships serve no long-term title
clearing purposes, as their effect is only temporary.109
Considering the above arguments, it seems safe to say that the current regime is inadequate to get absentee owners out of a mineral
title. Remedies originally used in the surface context and remedies
that were not developed to serve as title-clearing mechanisms have
proven themselves impotent to resolve the fractionalization of Texas’s
mineral estates.
IV. A POTENTIAL REMEDY
If the existing measures to fix excessive fractionalization have
proven ineffective, and another method is available, there is a strong
argument to be made that the new measure ought to be adopted. Several oil and gas producing states have chosen to adopt dormant mineral acts, and many commentators have endorsed them in
literature.110
Dormant mineral acts are as varied as the policy concerns and state
goals that motivate them. There are currently over twenty states that
have some incarnation of a dormant mineral act.111 The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the
Uniform Dormant Mineral Interests Act (“The Uniform Act”) in an
103. Id.
104. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 64.091 (West 2009).
105. § 64.091(c).
106. Id. § 64.091(f).
107. Morrow v. De Vitt, 160 S.W.2d 977, 985 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo, 1942, writ
ref’d w.o.m.).
108. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 64.091 (2014).
109. See supra accompanying note 103.
110. See Polston, supra note 6; Anna H. Ruth, Mixon v. One Newco, Inc.: A Look
at Dormant Mineral Acts, 6 J. MIN. L. & POL’Y 119 (1991).
111. Phillip E. Norvell, Dormancy Mineral Legislation: A Cure for the Malady or
Another Affliction, 16 E. MIN. L. INST. ch. 12, at 433 (1997), available at http://www
.emlf.org/clientuploads/directory/whitepaper/Norvell_97.pdf.
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attempt to create consistent dormant-mineral legislation across the
several states,112 but The Uniform Act has failed to take hold.113
In 2009, Representative Sid Miller of Erath County introduced
House Bill 834 (HB 834), a proposed dormant mineral act, to the
Texas House of Representatives.114 The bill was immediately given to
the Energy Resources Committee, and five years later it is still in legislative limbo.115
HB 834 varied drastically from The Uniform Act,116 and these differences illustrate some of the ways that Texas oil and gas policy justify departures from The Uniform Act. Conversely, HB 834’s fiveyear tenure in committee without any sign of advancement indicates
that some of its provisions may not be in line with Texas’s notions of
property ownership.
The Uniform Act favors flexibility in its administration, perhaps to
the point where the act lacks teeth. Allowing any owner’s use to serve
as use for other mineral owners,117 anyone can file preservation notices for any owner,118 and late recording of preservation notices to
salvage a mineral interest after a surface owner has instituted a suit
for title119 are all evidence that The Uniform Act is drafted to explicitly limit its application and divest as few mineral owners of their estates as possible.
HB 834, on the other hand, is a rigid statute that leaves little room
for error or nonuse of a mineral estate. A presumption of abandonment arises if a report of ownership is not filed within one year of the
acquisition of a mineral interest,120 and a surface owner can bring
suit for declaratory judgment in as little as one year if the mineral
owner does not record the report.121 Further, there is virtually no provision that allows an owner to retain ownership of a nonproductive mineral interest for a period longer than ten years,122 and the
112. UNIF. DORMANT MINERAL INTEREST ACT (1986), available at http://www.uni
formlaws.org/shared/docs/dormant%20mineral%20interests/udmia_final_86.pdf.
113. See MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 15-1203 (LexisNexis 2007). This is one of the
few enacted dormant mineral acts that resembles the Uniform Dormant Mineral Interests Act enough to raise a strong implication that the state act was inspired by the
Uniform Dormant Mineral Interests Act.
114. TEX. H.B. 834, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009).
115. TEXAS LEGISLATURE ONLINE, http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/BillLookup/Histo
ry.aspx?LegSess=81R&Bill=HB834 (last visited Feb. 27, 2014).
116. Compare TEX. H.B. 834, with UNIF. DORMANT MINERAL INTERESTS ACT
(1986).
117. UNIF. DORMANT MINERAL INTERESTS ACT § 4(b)(1).
118. Id. § 5(b).
119. Id. § 6.
120. TEX. H.B. 834 § 30.005(a).
121. Id. §§ 30.003(a), .005(a), .006(b).
122. See id. § 30.002(5); supra text accompanying notes 79–87. The only way to
preserve an unused interest is to pay taxes on the interests, but these taxes are seldom
assessed. See supra text accompanying notes 79–87.
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time for abandonment is short compared to most dormant mineral
acts.123
HB 834’s restrictive terms evidence a strong bias for developing oil
and gas properties and reuniting surface and mineral estates. While
The Uniform Act may be effective in preventing fractionalization
from occurring in areas where it has not already become a problem,
the Act is arguably not aggressive enough to remedy the longstanding
effects of over a century of division like that exists in Texas. As such,
this Comment proposes a statutory scheme that incorporates the desirable elements of both The Uniform Act and HB 834, often looking
to the dormant mineral acts of other oil and gas producing states for
guidance when the two acts differ. This amalgamation of the most
appropriate parts of various dormant mineral acts likely can address
the existing fractionalization, without undermining the strong notions
of property ownership that exist in Texas.124 With these goals in mind,
consider The Proposed Act.
A. The Proposed Act
A Proposed Dormant Mineral Act
Section 1. Applicability.
This Act does not apply to any mineral interests owned by the
United States or the State of Texas or an agency or political subdivision of the United States or the State of Texas, except to the extent
permitted by federal or state law.
Section 2. Definitions.
In this Act:
(A) “Interest in the surface” means a fee interest, whether conditional or not, from which a mineral interest has been severed.
123. Compare, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 15-1203 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013)
(requiring twenty years for abandonment), CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-33q (West
2009) (requiring twenty years for abandonment), and N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18.1-02
(2014) (requiring twenty years for abandonment), with GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-168
(2010) (requiring seven years of non-use raises presumption of adverse possession of
minerals by surface owner, essentially a dormant mineral statute by another name).
124. See generally, e.g., Christian Brooks, Political Bluff and Bluster: Six Years
Later, A Comment on the Texas Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act, 33
TEX. TECH L. REV. 59 (2001); George E. Grimes, Jr., Texas Private Real Property
Rights Preservation Act: A Political Solution to the Regulatory Takings Problem, 27
ST. MARY’S L.J. 557 (1996); Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex.
2012); David A. Johnson, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Construction of Restrictive Covenants After the Implementation of Section 202.003 of the Texas Property
Code, 32 TEX. TECH L. REV. 355 (2001) (demonstrating various aspects of Texas’s
general preference for strong individual property rights).
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(B) “Mineral interest” means an interest in oil, gas, or other minerals in place that is severed from the ownership of an interest in
the surface and includes a fee interest, whether conditional or
not, life estate, estate for years, remainder interest, reversion,
possibility of reverter, right of entry, executory interest, leasehold interest, royalty interest, executive right, or other present
possessory interest, future interest, equitable interest, or concurrent ownership interest.
(C) “Surface owner” means a person who has concurrent or sole
legal right or title to a present interest in real property from
which a mineral interest has been severed, except the holder of
a leasehold interest or an estate for years.
(D) “Use” of a mineral interest can occur by:
(1) Active mineral operations on or below the surface of the
real property or other property unitized or pooled with the
real property, including production, geophysical exploration, exploratory or developmental drilling, mining, exploitation, development, operations for injection,
withdrawal, storage, or disposal of water, gas, or other
fluid substances in connection with the interest;
(2) Payment of taxes of the mineral interest by the owner;
(3) Payment by the interest’s owner of rentals or royalties for
the purpose of delaying or enjoying the use of the interest;
(4) Recordation of an instrument that creates, reserves, or
otherwise evidences a claim to or the continued existence
of the mineral interest, including an instrument that transfers, leases, or divides the interest. Recordation of an instrument constitutes use of (i) any recorded interest owned
by any person in any mineral that is the subject of the instrument, and (ii) any recorded mineral interest in the
property owned by any party to the instrument;
(5) Recordation of a judgment or decree that makes specific
reference to the mineral interest; or
(6) Recordation of a Report of Ownership of Mineral Interest
pursuant to Section 3.
Section 3. Report of Ownership of Mineral Interest.
(A) A person who owns a mineral interest on the date of enactment of this Act must, within one year from the date of enact-
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ment of this Act, file a Report of Mineral Ownership with the
county clerk of the county that contains the interest. A person
who acquires a mineral interest after the date of enactment of
this Act must, within one year from the date the interest was
acquired, file a Report of Mineral Ownership with the county
clerk of the county in which the interest is located.
(B) An owner of a mineral interest may record at any time a report
of ownership of mineral interest. The mineral interest is preserved in each county in which the report is recorded. A mineral interest is not abandoned if a report is recorded within ten
(10) years prior to commencement of the action to terminate
the mineral interest.
(C) The report may be executed by an owner of the mineral interest or by another person acting at the direction of the owner,
including an owner who is under a disability or unable to assert
a claim on the owner’s own behalf.
(D) The report must be subscribed and acknowledged in the same
manner as required for a deed and must contain the name of
the owner of the mineral interest or other persons for whom
the mineral interest is to be preserved, and must identify the
mineral interest or part thereof to be preserved by one of the
following means.
(1) A reference to the location in the records of the instrument that creates, reserves, or otherwise evidences the interest or of the judgment or decree that confirms the
interest. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, a report recorded to satisfy the requirements of Section 3(A)
must identify the mineral interest or part thereof to be preserved by a reference to the location in the records of the
instrument that creates, reserves, or otherwise evidences
the interest or of the judgment or decree that confirms the
interest.
(2) A reference generally and without specificity to any or all
mineral interests of the owner in any real property situated
in the county. The reference is not effective to preserve a
particular mineral interest unless there is, in the county, in
the name of the person claiming to be the owner of the
interest, a report that identifies the interest with a reference to the location in the records of the instrument that
creates, reserves, or otherwise evidences the interest or of
the judgment or decree that confirms the interest, and one
of the following: (i) a previously recorded instrument that
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creates, reserves, or otherwise evidences that interest or
(ii) a judgment or decree that confirms that interest.
Section 4. Recording of Records of Mineral Ownership.
On receipt of a Record of Mineral Ownership pursuant to Section
3, the county clerk shall record the report in separately maintained
public record, and maintain that record in the same manner as required for deeds.
Section 5. Presumption of Abandonment on Failure to File Record
of Mineral Ownership.
(A) An owner of a mineral interest who fails to file a report as
required by Section 3(A) is presumed to have abandoned the
interest, and title to the interest is presumed to belong to the
owner or owners of the interest in the surface from which it
was severed, with each owner owning the same share and the
same type of ownership in the mineral interest as the person
has in the surface.
(B) A mineral interest is not abandoned if the owner of the interest
files a report under Section 3 before the court renders a judgment under Section 6 declaring the interest abandoned.
Section 6. Judicial Proceeding.
(A) A surface owner may request the court to declare a mineral
interest abandoned by filing a petition for declaratory judgment in the district court of the county where the real property
is located.
(B) The court may declare a mineral interest abandoned only if the
interest has not been used in the ten (10) years prior, unless
Section 5(A) raises the presumption of abandonment. The tenyear period does not begin to run before the date of enactment
of this Act. No disability or lack of knowledge of any kind on
the part of any person suspends the running of the ten (10)
year period.
Section 7. Vesting of Title.
(A) If a court declares a mineral interest abandoned, title to the
interest vests in the owner or owners of the interest in the surface from which it was severed, with each owner taking the
same share and the same type of ownership in the mineral interest as the person has in the surface.
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(B) A person who acquires title to a mineral interest in an abandonment proceeding under this chapter may record, in the
same manner as a deed, a certified copy of the judgment as
evidence of title.
B. Analysis of the Proposed Act
The primary aim of The Proposed Act is to efficiently reduce fractionalization by removing unknown and absentee owners with minimal collateral damage to owners that can be found without needlessly
destabilizing the mineral interests of known owners. This is accomplished through broad use allowances, balanced by short abandonment times, aggressive burden shifts to the mineral owner, countered
with easy rebuttals by the mineral owners, and several other contrasting provisions designed to ensure quick elimination of absentee owners while offering ample protection for known owners. Although
incidentally, The Proposed Act would also ease examiners in determining mineral titles and revealing difficult-to-find owners.
Section 1 of The Proposed Act excludes operation of the act on
mineral interests owned by the state or the federal government or any
associated entities. Exclusions like this are common in dormant mineral acts, and similar limitations were included in both The Uniform
Act and HB 834. Aside from obvious political and legal concerns, this
exclusion also makes sense in light of the goal of a dormant mineral
act.125 The act is aimed at reducing instances of unproductive, absentee owners, and remedying the fractionalization that that type of ownership causes. As political entities do not die intestate, and can be
reliably located in the event of potential development, it would serve
none of the functions of the act to include them in the reach of The
Proposed Act.126
Section 2 of The Proposed Act is the definitional section and
mimics existing dormant mineral acts. The definition of “mineral interest,” adopted from HB 834,127 is drafted as broadly as possible and
is clearly intended to reach any conceivable interests in a mineral estate. The definition of the mineral interests is drafted to only include
interests in minerals that have already been severed from the surface,128 avoiding a situation where an owner of both surface and minerals in a tract is subject to loss of title of his minerals under the act.
125. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-33p (West 2009); MD. CODE ANN., EN§ 15-1202 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 554.292 (West
Supp. 2014).
126. See UNIF. DORMANT MINERAL INTEREST ACT § 3 cmt. (1986), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/dormant%20mineral%20interests/udmia_fi
nal_86.pdf.
127. TEX. H.B. 834, 81st Leg., R.S. § 30.002(3) (2009).
128. Supra Part IV.A. The Proposed Act § 2(B).
VIR.
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“Surface Owner” is defined largely to delineate who may sue for
declaratory judgment to have a mineral interest declared abandoned.
This definition is a procedural machination and limits potential plaintiffs to those with present interest in the surface.129
The seemingly benign “interest in the surface” definition hides its
importance. The definition circumscribes any fee interest in the surface—from fee simple absolute to a contingent remainder in fee simple determinable—and is later used in Section 7 to define whom the
mineral interest vests to after a judicial finding of abandonment.
The final set of definitions establishes the activities that serve as
“use” to evidence a lack of abandonment by a mineral owner. The
“use” in Section 2(D)(1) is intended to encompass a wide range of
operations, essentially ensuring that a mineral owner who is engaging
in development of minerals is protected from loss. This definition
modifies the “use” contemplated in The Uniform Act to include disposal and storage of fluid gases and other substances, uses explicitly
exempted in The Uniform Act.130 This deviation is supported by similar provisions in the dormant mineral acts of other major oil and gas
producing states.131 Further, HB 834 explicitly included a provision
allowing injection operations to serve as use.132
Payment of taxes as use is an innocuous provision routinely included in dormant mineral acts,133 as is the payment of rentals and
royalties,134 and both are included in HB 834,135 while only the tax
payment provision is in The Uniform Act.136 Payment of taxes evidences that the owner has not abandoned his or her interest, and payment of royalties or rentals—even ignoring the strong implication that
there are active operations (use in its own right) responsible for generating the royalties—implies the owner has a continuing interest in the
minerals and has not abandoned them.
The next two uses are not found in HB 834, and are instead adopted
from The Uniform Act.137 While these uses are arguably redundant,
as the recordation of an instrument or judgment that references an
129. Supra Part IV.A. The Proposed Act § 2(C).
130. UNIF. DORMANT MINERAL INTEREST ACT § 4(b)(1).
131. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-03(1)(b) (West 2014); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 5301.56 (B)(3)(c) (LexisNexis 2004).
132. Injection wells are a practical necessity in large oil and gas fields, mineral owners must consent to the use. The injection actions occupy the mineral interest to promote development, so this type of use seems justified in Texas.
133. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.56 (B)(3)(f); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-2310-3(a)(6) (West 2013).
134. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 32-23-10-3(a)(3); TEX. H.B. 834, 81st Leg., R.S.
(2009).
135. TEX. H.B. § 30.002 (5)(C), (F).
136. UNIF. DORMANT MINERAL INTEREST ACT § 4(b)(2) (1986), available at http://
www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/dormant%20mineral%20interests/udmia_final_86
.pdf.
137. UNIF. DORMANT MINERAL INTEREST ACT § 4(b)(3)–(4).
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interest would likely be considered a new acquisition to the parties
and restart the time under Section 3, these broad uses ensure that
owners who are cognizant of their interests do not lose them.
Finally, The Proposed Act explicitly treats the recording of a Report of Mineral Ownership as a use. No comparable provision was
included in HB 834, but they are common in dormant mineral acts of
other states.138 Without a provision that allows for non-use, a dormant mineral act changes from a legal construct designed to remedy
fractionalization and unknown owners to a statute that essentially requires an owner to develop a mineral interest or lose it. Though payment of taxes could save an unused mineral interest, as mentioned
above, these taxes are only sporadically assessed, and so a provision
specifically approving non-use is necessary to reliably allow unused
interests to be preserved. Although Texas is a heavy oil and gas producing state, as noted above, the state also has a long history of promoting individual property rights. Couple that history with a litany of
reasons why a mineral owner may not be developing the property
(e.g., waiting for prices to go up, environmental concerns, no development opportunities in the area), and it becomes apparent that without
a non-use provision, The Proposed Act would be squarely in the middle of a thorny policy debate between development and property
rights. With the provision though, the act clearly points at unknown
absentee owners.
Section 3 of The Proposed Act establishes the reporting requirements and procedures that a mineral owner must and may take to
secure a mineral interest. The first paragraph adopts a novel provision from HB 834 that requires a mineral owner to record a Report of
Mineral Ownership within one year from acquiring the interest (or
one year from the date the act goes into effect).139 The consequences
of failure to record are discussed more thoroughly in the analysis of
Section 4.
This section also authorizes a mineral owner to file a report anytime, with the report acting as use of the mineral interest, as elaborated on in the previous section.
Paragraph (C) and (D) give the procedural requirements of the report.140 Paragraph (C) is a stripped down version of its very liberal
counterpart contained in The Uniform Act.141 The Proposed Act re138. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 78.22.030 (West 2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 554.292 (West Supp. 2014); MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 15-1204 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2013).
139. Compare Tex. H.B. 834 § 30.003(a), with, e.g., supra Part IV.A. The Proposed
Act § 3(A), and N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-01 to 38-18.1-08 (West 2014). In
fact, no enacted dormant mineral acts contained a provision even remotely similar in
substance or effect.
140. See supra Part IV.A. The Proposed Act § 3(C)–(D).
141. Compare supra Part IV.A. The Proposed Act § 3(C), with UNIF. DORMANT
MINERAL INTEREST ACT § 5(b).

522

TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

quires an owner or a party acting at the direction of the owner to record a report. The Uniform Act allows virtually anyone to file a
comparable report to preserve an interest for themselves or on behalf
of any and all other owners, even unknown owners that can be identified by class.142 The Proposed Act would not be alone in rejecting
such broad allowances in recording reports that prevent abandonment,143 and allowing the same would certainly undermine the goal of
reducing fractionalization caused by unknown absentee owners.
While paragraph (C) maintains fairly rigid requirements as to who
can record, paragraph (D) follows the lead of The Uniform Act in
allowing a mineral owner to record a general blanket report covering
any interest in the county that the report is filed,144 assuming the interest has been reported with specificity previously. On acquisition,
an owner must record an initial report that identifies the interest by
reference to the instrument or decree that vested the interest,145 but
thereafter can save any interests in a county with one report, so long
as the chain of title clearly demonstrates ownership.146 Allowing
these blanket notices is a “practical necessity”147 for owners that own
a large number of tracts in a county and is a clear convenience for all
mineral owners who wish to preserve their interests. States that have
adopted dormant mineral acts influenced by The Uniform Act have
regularly retained this allowance.148
Section 4 is a procedural tool, inspired by Indiana’s dormant mineral act and HB 834.149 Accurately described as best practices, it requires the county to maintain a separate set of books and indexes for
the reports. An overwhelming majority of enacted dormant mineral
acts do not explicitly include a similar provision,150 and the provision
probably does not contribute directly to the overall goal of reducing
fractionalization. However, the clear tangential benefits—e.g., easing
title examination and reducing clutter in the deed records—justify its
inclusion.
Section 5 is perhaps the clearest expression of the fact that The Proposed Act aims at absentee and unknown owners, instead of those
142. UNIF. DORMANT MINERAL INTEREST ACT § 5(b).
143. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-04 (West 2014) (requiring the report to be filed by the owner or the owner’s representative).
144. Compare supra Part IV.A. The Proposed Act § 3(D)(2), with UNIF. DORMANT
MINERAL INTEREST ACT § 5(c)(3).
145. See supra Part IV.A. The Proposed Act § 3(D)(1).
146. See supra Part IV.A. The Proposed Act § 3(D)(2).
147. UNIF. DORMANT MINERAL INTEREST ACT § 5(c)(3) cmt.
148. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 15-1204(c)(4) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013).
149. See IND. CODE ANN. § 32-23-10-7 (West 2013); TEX. H.B. 834, 81st Leg., R.S.
(2009).
150. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-01 to -08 (West 2014); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 5301.56 (LexisNexis 2004). A search of all known dormant mineral acts
only revealed one state, Indiana, required a separate set of records. See IND. CODE
ANN. § 32-23-10-7.
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who have not developed their minerals. Modeled on the novel section
30.005 of HB 834, this section of the act raises a rebuttable presumption of abandonment of a mineral interest if the owner does not file a
report as required by Section 3(A) and allows a mineral owner to conclusively rebut a finding of abandonment by filing a report pursuant to
Section 3 prior to judgment.151 The dichotomy between severe consequences for failure to record and complete “forgiveness” if recording
occurs should serve to maintain the meaningfulness of the records. It
also supports the assertion that the Act only targets owners that have
failed to maintain familiarity with their property, as anyone who
knows about a proceeding may defeat it by simply recording a report,
while a safe presumption exists that most of the losers under the act
will lose because they are absent from the property.
Section 6 addresses the procedural components of terminating an
abandoned mineral interest. The Proposed Act, unlike the Indiana
dormant mineral act challenged in Texaco v. Short, is not a self-executing statute and requires a surface owner to seek a court order to
terminate the interest. Although the Indiana statute was upheld, most
modern dormant mineral acts err on the side of caution and completely avoid this due-process challenge. Instead, The Proposed Act
requires court intervention—along with the accompanying notice that
it entails152—before declaring an interest terminated.153 Section 6
also defines the time required for abandonment, assuming a presumption is not raised by Section 5, as ten years, a comparatively short time
period.154 Further, in an effort to reduce the justiciable questions in
these proceedings, Section 6 does not toll the ten-year period, a common provision in enacted dormant mineral acts of other states.155
Finally, Section 7 describes how an abandoned mineral interest is
dispersed. Title to the interest does not go to “surface owners” but to
“owners of the interest in the surface.”156 This wording is not mere
semantics, because The Proposed Act defines both terms.157 The Proposed Act is explicit that any person who owns an interest in the fee
of the surface takes according to his or her proportionate share and
type of ownership. So someone with half of the fee simple title to the
surface would receive one-half of the abandoned mineral interest in
151. Supra Part IV.A. The Proposed Act § 5.
152. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1950).
153. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-33q (West 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 38-18.1-06.1.
154. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 15-1203 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013) (twenty
years for abandonment); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-33q (twenty years for abandonment); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-02 (twenty years for abandonment). But
see GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-168 (2010) (seven years of non-use raises presumption of
adverse possession of minerals by surface owner, essentially a dormant mineral statute by another name).
155. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-33q(a).
156. Supra Part IV.A. The Proposed Act § 7(A).
157. Supra Part IV.A. The Proposed Act § 2.
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fee simple, while an owner of a contingent remainder of one-quarter
of the fee interest in the surface would take a contingent remainder of
one-quarter of the fee interest of the abandoned mineral interest.158
This clear expression of who takes what is present in some, but not all,
enacted dormant mineral acts and attempts to reduce tangential litigation in proceedings under The Proposed Act.159
Each individual section of The Proposed Act, viewed in isolation,
looks familiar, as the act takes cues from existing dormant mineral
acts. As a whole, the act is something new. What makes The Proposed Act effective and appropriate for the needs of Texas is the subtle balance of point and counter point. This internal tension allows for
quick termination of legitimately abandoned interests, and readily
available protections for unabandoned interests.
V. CONCLUSION
Dormant mineral acts are interesting statutory creatures, and legislatures that choose to enact them have wide latitude in shaping an act
that best fits the needs and culture of the enacting state. If a dormant
mineral act is adopted near the time that mineral severances become
common, even a weak act, like The Uniform Act, can keep fractionalization in check. Texas, however, does not have that luxury. Early
development encouraged early severances, many as far back as one
hundred years or more. A century of unchecked division, devise, and
inheritance has spread mineral interests among too many people. As
a counterpoint, though, Texas still conforms to a political culture that
champions individual property rights and loathes governmental intrusion into these rights. Any attempt at confronting the fractionalization issue must strike a delicate balance between efficiency and
respect for these values.
Existing law only incidentally—and not particularly effectively—addresses the issue. For most cases where a person owns a piece of
property that has been neglected for a long period of time, existing
law is perfectly suited for finding it a new and willing owner. Adverse
possession of surface estates and unsevered mineral estates, while fact
sensitive, is well settled as a matter of law. Tax sales and other legal
constructs also function competently on these properties. In the context of the severed mineral estate, though, these tools have proven
themselves less than capable.
Dormant mineral acts, however, are designed explicitly to function
on severed mineral estates. The difficulty in Texas is that such an act,
if not crafted with sufficient protections for individual property rights,
158. Supra Part IV.A. The Proposed Act § 5(A).
159. Compare, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 15-1203(d)(2) (stating clearly surface owners take proportionately and in same type), with IND. CODE ANN. § 32-23-102 (West 2013) (stating that the interest reverts to the owner of the interest out of
which the interest was carved, without specificity).
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may never survive the political process. Fortunately, Texas does not
have to reinvent the wheel and can instead look to the diverse group
of acts that currently exist for guidance in producing a dormant mineral act that aggressively terminates interests that ought to be disposed of, while subjecting the other interest owners to minimal
burdens. The Proposed Act offered in this Comment is one such iteration of a statute that satisfies those criteria. And while this Comment
does not suppose that The Proposed Act, or even a dormant mineral
act generally, is the only solution to the current trend of fractionalization, the nature of the issue and the demonstrable ineffectiveness of
the current framework suggest that The Proposed Act, or a similar
act, should at least be given serious consideration.

